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This paper’s purpose is to show a new informal social networks interpretation, according to which 
social networks change their nature if they are located in social contexts where organised crime is 
relevant. Here the perusal of a social network is just a necessary condition to enter the labour 
market  rather  than  a  deliberate  choice.  Moreover  this  labour  market  is  the  ground  where 




Lo scopo di questo studio è dimostrare come si possa attribuire un’interpretazione alternativa, 
rispetto a quella offerta dalla letteratura economica, dei reticoli sociali nel mercato del lavoro se 
osservati in contesti in cui è forte la presenza del crimine organizzato. In tal caso il ricorso alla 
rete per fini occupazionali non è frutto di una libera scelta ma diventa condizione necessaria per 
poter accedere al mercato del lavoro: un mercato che diventa così il campo sul quale vengono 
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1. Introduction 
Further to the recent and increasing attention on the ways and related issues through which 
workers/employers  are  looking  for  a  job/an  appropriate  application,  labour  force  and  employer 
surveys are starting including questions about channels used to find a job or to hire a worker. In the 
last  case,  concerns  arise  about  the  screening  selection  process  (approach).  Surveys  often  use 
multiple response questionnaires listing the different search channels, and, among those, appear also  
informal social networks. These ones in most cases, turn out to be the preferred channel used by 
labour market players. 
The economic literature on the issue consists of studies focussing on the effects of the use of 
this kind of channel on unemployment tenure, wages, productivity and so on. The main difference 
among them entails the network: some studies analyse its structure, size and density whereas others 
focus only on the choice of this channel by the labour market players but do not investigate on its 
characteristics. However, they do not analyse the nature of the network. Up to now, the literature 
proposes a sterile/positive interpretation of social networks, referring to them predominantly as 
relations providing information on job opportunities. My point of view is that behind the networks 
there could be a degenerative phenomenon for which social networks become a barrier for free 
labour market access. This wall is built by a “business-bureaucratic-political and criminal network” 
where organised crime often plays the main role. 
The  literature  on  organised  crime  too  assumes  a  generic  position  about  its  effects  on 
network’s dynamics associated with the labour market. Therefore we are entering an unexplored 
dimension that links labour market, organised crime and informal social networks. 
The purpose of this work is to present an alternative interpretation of the network assuming 
that  this  sterility  does  not  exist.  I  introduce  two  possible  interpretations  of  the  informal  social 
network’s nature: a positive one and a negative one. The latter represents what I call the black side 
of the network: my objective is to prove that the use of informal social networks by jobseekers is 
higher in contexts where organised crime is dominant.   
Using and opportunely changing the Calvò-Armengol and Zenou (2003) model, I consider 
two types of crime (micro and organised) and I relate them to the informal network use.  
The estimation of this relationship is carried out using an organised crime index (regressor), 
calculated  using  statistics  from  the  Home  Office  and  National  Statistics  Office,  and  a  dummy 
variable capturing the use of informal social networks (dependent variable), drawn out from the 
Survey on Household Income and Wealth - SHIW of the Bank of Italy (that provides information 
about job search methods: informal social networks, PES and so on). It is hypothesized that there is 
a positive but decreasing relationship between micro and organised crime. This relationship is tested 
introducing an innovative crime equation in comparison to the ones usually employed in literature. 
Therefore there are two econometric estimates: one refers to the crime equation and the second one 
to the social network equation. Both are based on cross section analysis for the year 2004: in the 
former estimate I run an OLS regression on the Italian provinces
1, in the latter estimate I run a 
Probit regression on the Italian regions.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a short review of the literature on 
informal social networks in labour market, Section 3 focuses on Italian economic literature on 
organised crime. The subsequent section highlights the new concept of informal social networks 
and explains the introduction of organised crime in the relationship between informal channels and 
labour market. The theoretical model, with the new three hypothesis, is developed in Section 5.  
Section 6 presents the econometric estimates and Section 7 closes the paper. 
                                                 
1  Provinces are local authorities and represent a territorial partition of Italy. It is divided into 20 regions and each 
regions is divided, in turn, into provinces. The number of these last ones vary among regions. For example the region 
Lazio is divided into 5 provinces (Roma, Viterbo, Latina, Frosinone, Rieti) whereas region Umbria into 2 provinces 
(Terni and Perugia). Finally, the provinces comprise municipalities. For example the province of Rome is composed by 
121 municipalities and Roma is one of these.   3 
2. The role of social networks on labour market 
Informal social networks play an important role in the labour market and this fact is well 
known by economists. The literature on social networks highlights the positive network’s effects 
resulting in a shorter unemployment period, due to higher break-even levels of labour supply and 
demand, and to the fluctuations of wage premiums. Bentolila and others (2004), Holzer (1987), 
Calvò  –  Armengol  (2004),  Lindeboom  and  others  (1994),  Linda  Datcher  Loury  (2006)  and 
Marmaros  –  Sacerdote  (2002),  for  example,  confirm  the  positive  relationship  between  social 
contacts and probability to be employed. Some of these papers point out that the positive effects are 
often mitigated by the negative ones which arise from the mismatching problem and productivity 
reduction.  
This positive relationship has been confirmed by Datcher Loury but at the same time she 
found that network efficiency depends either on network composition or source of information. 
Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002), utilizing a survey carried out by Darmouth College, in 2001, 
highlighted  the  possible  causality  between  job  opportunities  and  inclusion  in  students’  lobbies. 
Positive relationship between social networks’ use and probability to find a job is criticised in few 
papers. Cahuc – Fontaine (2002) and Fontaine (2004), for example, show that active labour market 
policies that tend to encourage social capital produce an increase of unemployment rate and a 
decrease  of  jobseekers’  wealth,  whereas  positive  effects  associated  to  the  labour  demand  side 
persist
2. Calvò – Armengol and Zenou (2003a, 2003b), prove the existence of a network’s size 
critical value over which there is a decreasing matching relation. This value affects the equilibrium 
unemployment rate, which decreases when the network’s size is lower than the critical value and 
increases when the network’s size exceeds that value. 
There are different positions on social contacts and wages. Some papers assert that jobs 
found trough informal social networks lead to higher wages (Kugler 2003, Calvò-Armangol and 
Jackson 2007, Holzer 1988, Santamaria Garcia 2004). Moreover, Santamaria Garcia finds that this 
channel is privileged by unskilled workers. An important contribution for the understanding of 
informal social networks in the labour market has been given by Montgomery (1991, 1992, 1994). 
In alternative to Bridge-Villemez’s (1986)  position, he highlighted that Granovetter’s (1995, 1998) 
hypothesis of the “strength of weak ties” is corroborated in terms of unemployment tenure but not 
definitely in term of wages. In fact, while Lin (1982) supports the idea that there are higher wages 
associated  with  weak  ties,  Granovetter  demonstrates  that  weak  ties  lead,  on  average,  to  lower 
wages. 
Bentolila and others (2004) show that jobs found through social networks require a low 
professional profile and provide lower wages than jobs found through formal channels. Similar 
results are found in Italy by Pistaferri (1999) and Pellizzari (2004a, 2004b). Cingano and Rosolia 
(2006), instead, conclude that there exists an inverse relationship between network quality and 
unemployment tenure. 
Some authors argue that in order to understand the labour market outcomes of a jobseeker 
using informal networks it is necessary to take into account the network structure (Calvò-Armengol 
2004, Calvò – Armengol – Jackson 2004)
3. These papers use Social Network Analysis – SNA that 
studies informal social network architecture
4. Finally, there is a branch of literature that studies how 
                                                 
2 Positive effects refer to information asimmetry and reduction of hiring costs. 
3Calvò-Armengol (2004) argue that “… the information inflow to any player is shaped by the network structure of his 
direct and two-links-away contacts. Direct contacts are beneficial whereas two-links-away contacts are detrimental. 
The net balance of these two effects is very much dependent on the details of the network structure. In particular, two 
networks with the same total number of links but different geometry may induce different aggregate unemployment 
levels…”. Calvò-Armengol – Jackson (2004) argue that the probability to found a job is related on the informal network 
composition: it decreases if networks are composed by unemployed. 
4 Scott J. (2003), Analisi delle reti sociali, Carocci. In Network Analysis there are two academic schools: the Manchester 
school and the Harvard school. The former has an anthropologic focus and focuses on the individual and its history (or 
story), the latter focuses on social network structure. This last methodology has become the dominant theory, although   4 
networks  and  their  structures  can  encourage  criminal  behaviours  (Gleaser  –  Sacerdote  – 
Scheinkman 1996, Sah 1991, Calvò Armengol – Zenou (2004), Calvò Armengol - Patacchini - 
Zenou (2005), Patacchini - Zenou (2008)). 
Based on the literature examined, it is possible to stress that the social networks have a 
sterile/positive profile. This profile seems unrealistic especially in the case of Italy, where social 
networks might even take the form of organized crime. 
3. A short review of Italian literature on organised crime   
The Italian literature on the economic effects of organised crime highlights that the criminal 
phenomenon  has  a  negative  impact  on  regional  growth  and  development  opportunities  (Sylos 
Labini 1965, 1985; Olson 1984, Centorrino-Signorino 1993, 1997; Boltho 2006, Daniele-Marani 
2008). Some works have concluded that a strong presence of the public sector and massive public 
resource flows can encourage the diffusion and the reinforcement of organised crime in a local 
economy (D’Antonio – Scarlato 1993, Felli – Tria 2000, Caruso 2008). An economic structure 
primarily oriented towards small or medium firms, active in traditional economic sectors, such as 
construction and agriculture, is more sensitive to organised crime; these are further elements which 
should help understanding why Italian regions (particularly in the southern part of Italy) are victims 
of  this  criminal  system  (Lavezzi  2008).  Other  researches  point  out  how  associated  crime 
phenomena  can  interfere  on  the  level  of  confidence  among  market  agents  (Zamagni  1993, 
Campiglio 1993), whereas other papers review how organised crime has been considered in the 
economic field (Masciandaro 2000b), investigate associated crime in firms and also compromise as 
factor in legal productive activity (Masciandaro 2000a). 
Literature on crime and employment is primarily based on crime as work model that is the 
microeconomic choice between committing or not committing an offence deriving from associated 
opportunity cost or social-cultural factors and it is expressed by a crime equation (Becker 1968, 
Marselli – Vannini 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Bonanno – Pastore 2003, Sah 1991, Gleaser et al.1996). 
From a macroeconomic point of view, the causal relationships between crime and unemployment 
rates (Masciandaro 1999, Marselli – Vannini 2000, Calvò-Armengol Zenou 2003) and that between 
crime  and  labour  productivity  (Centorrino  –  Ofria  2001,  2008;  Felli  –  Tria  2000)  have  been 
investigated. Costabile – Giannola (1996), instead, include corruption into the analysis of southern 
labour market. They use two labour market models: the first one take into account PA sector, 
assuming that the hiring process is based on a very high discretional use, the second one refer to the 
industrial sector that should be representative of  sectors where a market selection criteria is used. 
Both models present a labour supply surplus. Workers maximize the utility function that is positive 
related respect the expected income and negative related respect the payoff if it is paid in favour of 
Public Official in order to obtain a job and violating social rules.  
Workers or Public Official, pay or accept, the payoff if the expected utility of corruption 
strategy is higher than that one of alternative strategy. This is called  “infraction condition” of both 
agents and determines the maximum or minimum value of the payoff. This value is positive related 
to current and expected wages of agents. The equilibrium is where “infraction condition” functions 
crossing. So the short term labour market equilibrium determines the number of illegal exchanges 
and the equilibrium payoff. The corrupted Public Official will apply a different payoff for each 
workers, for the same product (the job). 
The size of illegal market of job depend on the probability to be discovered and in turn 
depend  from  the  controllers  of  the  Public  Official.  The  controllers  of  Public  Official  can  be 
corrupted too and so there is a self-increase of this kind of system. In this case the Public Official’s 
controller is the politician that, usually, give the administrative charge. In this case the political 
                                                                                                                                                                 
in recent years there is a hot debate about its excessive deterministic rigour. The academic world is trying to reconcile 
these two schools highlighting the importance of both aspects. www.insna.org  is the non-profit association website. 
This association, founded by Barr Wellman in 1978, is the trait d’union of these schools.   5 
payoff is the electoral consensus. The political control of jobs is intermediate by the public official 
who, in such a case, take the payoff from the politician. 
So there are two types of interactions: the relation between unemployed and public official 
and the other one between unemployed and politician. In this last case the payoff is paid from the 
politician to the public official because unemployed will pay politician by the electoral consensus. 
This last type of corruption is more dangerous because the unemployed do not pay the payoff and 
the consequence is that the predisposition to violate social rules is higher in the politician corruption 
system than in the administrative corruption. So in the long time period the number of persons that 
violate social rules can increase if there are strong economic incentives (like unemployment, low 
probability  to  be  discovered  etc.).  According  to  what  say  above  and  considering  the  negative 
correlation between unemployment rate and the survival of code of conduct, the authors conclude 
that only reducing unemployment there will be possible to obviate to “wrong” behaviours. 
With exception of the work by Costabile – Giannola (1996)
5, no work has dealt with the 
barrier that the Mafia imposes on labour market access. Therefore, it is important to investigate the 
impact of the organised crime on the labour market, trying to sort out what social networks really 
mean in contexts where organised crime is relevant. 
4. Informal social networks, organised crime and labour market relationships 
The examination of the informal social networks is indispensable for a correct interpretation 
of the behaviours and choices of agents in the labour market. In this way we might produce a more 
realistic interpretation of labour market functioning. 
Informal networks are generally thought of as an inherited (through relatives) or ‘made-up’ 
(through friends or acquaintances) relationship systems that incorporates weak or strong ties: “Each 
individual has tight and permanent relationships with close friends and relatives (strong ties) as 
well as random and transitory interactions within the community (weak ties)”  (Calvò Armengol – 
Zenou 2003a). 
The literature on the subject does not seem to consider the particular nature that this network 
can  assume  in  some  contexts.  My  point  of  view  is  that  behind  the  networks  there  could  be  a 
degenerative phenomenon in which social networks become a barrier for free labour market access. 
This wall is built by a “business- bureaucratic-political and criminal network” 
6. 
The  literature  on  organised  crime,  too,  assumes  a  generic  position  about  its  effects  on 
network dynamics associated with the labour market. So, we enter an unexplored area of studies, 
which  links  the  labour  market,  organised  crime  and  informal  social  networks
7.We  attempt  to 
provide an answer to the following questions: 1) what is the nature of the social networks? 2) what 
do we mean when we say that social networks “provide information about job opportunities”?. 
First, I consider also a network’s black side. In this case, there are two aspects of the nature 
of social networks: a positive and a negative one. 
We  have  a  positive  social  network  if  social  interactions  are  not  based  on  opportunistic 
purposes  and  the  opposite  for  the  negative  network  (social  interactions  based  on  opportunistic 
purposes). 
Furthermore, we perceive the relevance of social networks in the labour market because they 
are one of the most important channels by which there is a job (opportunities) information flow. 
I assume, as in the literature, that social networks are composed by strong and weak social 
interactions. Strong ties are represented by parents, friends, and tend to create positive networks 
                                                 
5 Tullio – Quarella (1999) just mention on the distort effects of organised crime on labour market. 
6  La  Spina  A.  Mafia,  legalità  debole  e  sviluppo  del  Mezzogiorno,  Il  Mulino  2005.  This  circuit  also  operates  on 
businessmen who can undertake economic activities. 
7 Felli e Tria (2000) only refer to access barriers on labour and commodity markets by criminal cartels. Costabile and 
Giannola  (1996),  instead,  explicity  take  into  account  the  corruption  problem  on  labour  market  focusing  on 
microeconomic behaviours according to social rules.   6 
(because I presume that social interactions aren’t based on opportunistic purposes). Weak ties are 
acquaintances (random meetings) and they can lead to positive or negative networks. When we talk 
about negative social networks we refer to weak ties. 
Second, I distinguish between neutral and influent or non-neutral information about job 
opportunities. The former does not lead necessary to fill the vacancy, the latter is decisive in filling 
it. I assume in my model that positive social networks can provide either neutral or not neutral job 
information and negative social networks provide non-neutral job information. Finally, I assume 
that jobseekers are non-negative social network members (weak ties).  
If we look at negative social network members, such as corrupted politicians and mafiosos: 
why should negative social networks pay attention to an external agent request? The first members 
(politicians)  might  be  interested  in  electoral  consensus  and  second  ones  (mafiosos)  in  social 
consensus and territorial control. Social consensus is fundamental for this kind of system
8. The 
Italian context is characterized by a strong compromise between mafia, politics and the economy 
and a controlled labour market. In this case the dependence on informal social networks is very 
strong, and sometimes it is the only way to gain access to the labour market. In the light of these 
facts, the quantitative analysis intends to verify whether there is a positive relationship between the 
use of social networks and the presence of organised crime
9 in an area or territory. 
5. The model 
We employ the Calvò-Armengol and Zenou (2003)’s model, according to which: 
 
!  Job opportunities are vehiculated by social networks, 
!  Network composition is: weak and strong ties, as argued by Granovetter, 
!  The strength of ties depends on the frequency of meetings (strong ties are parents and friends, 
weak ties are acquaintances), 
!  Only the labour force (employed and unemployed looking for a job) can provide or receive job 
opportunities information, 
!  Criminals do not constitute labour force and cannot provide information on job opportunities. 
 
The  authors  show  that  an  increase  in  the  number  of  criminals  in  the  society  reduces  the 
network’s size, because it increases the probability of meeting a criminal, reduces information flows 
about jobs and so reduces the probability to have job information. 
While Calvò-Armengol and Zenou talk about tout-court crime, I argue that it is necessary to 
clarify which kind of crime we refer to. I consider two kinds of crime: micro and organised crime. I 
assume different effects on the probability to use network-related job search methods: producing a 
positive effect for organised crime and a negative for micro-crime (as in the previous cases). 
On the basis of this difference in crime networks and in the light of some perplexity about 
Calvò-Armengol and Zenou’s algebric formulation model, I introduce new hypotheses: 
 
1.  there are two kinds of crime (!): organised (!2) and micro (!1); 
2.  crime nature produces positive and negative effects on the dimension of the network (s); 
3.  organised crime is one of the crime equation regressors and is positively correlated to micro-
crime with decreasing marginal increase. 
 
I assume, like Calvò-Armengol and Zenou, that there exists a collective of n persons, that the 
group size of a group built on strong ties is f and is the same for each agent, and, furthermore, that 
groups are mutually exclusive. If there are only strong ties, the society will be composed of n/f 
groups. Weak ties are represented by social interactions between agents of different groups. 
                                                 
8 See Costabile – Giannola (1996). 
9 Organised crime is an expression of itself and a proxy of corruption.   7 
 
The formulation model is: 
 
n    people composing the society 
f     friends and parents of strong ties group 
m = (n – f)  weak ties group  
nWSI    persons through which we have Weak Social Interaction (WSI) 
nSSI    persons through which we have Strong Social Interaction (SSI) 
!D     proportion of weak ties       (0 " #D " 1) 
!F     proportion of strong ties        (0 " #F " 1)  
s    useful job information network size  
mCR  criminals in the society m 
mNCR  no criminals in the society m  
"     proportion of criminals tout court in the society m           
(1 – ")  proportion of no criminal weak ties and, consequently, useful job information  
    
"2   proportion of criminal membership in organised crime   
"1     proportion of criminal membership in micro crime   
 
!D # !F  and both  are included between  0 and 1 
 
(1 – !D)   are all possible weak ties that not occur. The same is for  (1 - !F) 
 
Now we reformulate the three new hypotheses: 
 
1.   
2.   and   
3.   and so:    e   
The  average  number  of  contacts  for  each  agent  (considering  both  strong  and  weak  ties 
interactions) is: 
 
The number of social interactions that could provide job information (s) will be lower or 
equal than this average number. Therefore, if some f members are in the labour force (like Calvò-
Armengol and Zenou, 2003a) and if in the weak society there are some criminals which do not 
provide job information: 
 
   8 
 
 
Instead if I assume that micro crime does not have this kind of function (providing job 






Therefore, the useful social network size to job information is: 
  (4) 
deriving network size in respect to weak ties I obtain: 
      if          that is 
10 
The positive effects of weak ties on network size depend on the composition of the society: 
it is necessary that the community is not entirely composed by micro criminals. 
Assuming  ,  I  hypothesize  a  direct  relationship,  with  decreasing  marginal 
increase, between organised and micro crime (point 3). The nature and size of micro crime depend 
on the presence of organised crime in the regions: in regions where organised crime is present and 
relevant there will be a negligible micro crime size
11. 
Why is there a direct but decreasing relationship between micro and organised crime? Micro 
crime assumes different size and meaning in function of a society’s permeability to the mafia: 
generally, the more pervasive organised crime is, the lesser is micro crime. Just a low level of micro 
crime is compatible with and tolerated by associated crime (for example Crotone is the province 
where the organised crime index is the highest after Imperia and has one of the lowest micro crime 
indexes). It is also true that a higher level of micro crime is possible if there is an organised crime 
‘clan’ structure (for example Naples in Campania).  





!1 e !2  represent micro and organised crime respectively, both positive variables; 
A    is the constant: micro crime not influenced by independent variables; 
$ e %j  are  the  partial  elasticities:  they  represent  micro  crime  sensibility  to  independent 
variables increase; 
Zj  collects  k  control  variables  that  can  contribute  to  explain  the  micro  crime 
phenomenon. 
We assume:  0 < $ < 1,  -1 < %j < 1 
 
Focussing on the meaning regressor, the crime equation becomes: 
                                                 
10 If  !2 = (! - !1) we can write the derivative results in this way  (1– !)m + (! - !1)m and then it becomes m - !1m 
11 This is not always true, micro crime is functional to organised crime. So, the presence of micro crime phenomena 
depends either on the mafia’s choices or can derive from the organised crime structure. 
Total contacts 
 
No criminal contacts  Criminals 
 Total contacts  Criminal and no criminal 
contacts useful to job 
information 
Criminal interactions not 
useful for job information 
(micro crime)   9 
  (5) 
The first and second derivative show the expected sign: the first one is positive and the 
second one is negative




where        ,   e  . 
 





 ;              point 2 
6. The empirical results 
There are two econometric estimates: the first one refers to the crime equation and the 
second one to the social network equation. Both are based on cross sectional analysis for 2004: in 
the former estimate I used cross-sectional data for the Italian provinces and for each province the 








Micro and organised crime indexes have been elaborated using, at a provincial level, the 
Istat  (Italian  Institute  for  Statistics)  crime  statistics  and,  at  a  regional  level,  the  Ministero 
dell’Interno  (Home  Office)  statistics.  When  it  has  been  possible  we  have  used  Home  office 
statistics because they permit to take into account more crimes respect to Istat crime statistics (see 
Variables list at the end of the paper). 
The latter estimate is a probit regression: the probabilistic relationship between the use of 
social networks and crime (micro and organised) is:  
 
 
                                                 
12   and     10 
 
In this case, regressors x, collected in a Xi matrix, are represented by micro and macro 
variables. The first ones are drawn from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) of 
the Bank of Italy and provide informations about job search methods (informal social networks, 
PES and so on) and individual characteristics. The second ones have been carried out by the Istat 
and  the  Ministero  dell’Interno  (Home  Office)  and  include  socio-economic  variables  (education 
dispersion rate, unemployment rate, per capita GDP etc.). The main macro regressors are micro and 
organised crime. These estimates, related to the crime equation, are at regional level. The sample is 
formed by 1312 observations, composed of employed workers in the private sector that answered 
questions about job search channels. In this case, the social networks dummy is one. 
The  crime  variables  used  in  these  estimates  have  different  compositions  deriving  from 
territorial distribution. See Appendix variables. 
The first estimates concern crime equation. Results seem to confirm a positive but marginal 
decreasing relationship between micro and organised crime. There are three sets of estimates: the 
first one regresses criminal statistical variables (control on territory, police investigation skills, etc.) 
on  micro  crime;  the  second  one  takes  into  account  socio-economic  variables  (per  capita  GDP, 
education dispersion rate, etc.); and the last regression combines all variables (table 1). For each 
step  we  have  statistically  significant  results.  The  organised  crime  variable  has  a  positive  and 
significant effect. In the full model, relationships with other variables are corroborated except for 
lnffoo (mod. 6 and 7). Police investigation skills (lnineffpol) are positively related to micro crime. 
This finding is not contradictory. The variable lnineffpol represents unknown reported micro crime 
on total reported micro crime, so this is a possible measure of police investigation errors in skill: an 
increase in this variable is very likely to determine an increase in unknown micro crime. A police 
investigation decrease in skills can induce larger micro crime levels. Another variable is police 
territory  control  (lnffoo),  which  is  negatively  correlated  to  micro  crime  because  an  increase  in 
territorial  control  can  reduce  the  phenomenon  of  micro  crime.  The  effect  of  lnprob  is  not 
significant: this indicates that it is not a relevant determinant.
13 The socio-economic variables are 
statistically  significant,  too.  I  take  out  of  the  model  the  unemployment  rate  due  to  a 
multicollinearity problem.
14 A positive relationship between regressors and micro crime emerges. 
An education dispersion rate increase seems to encourage the micro crime phenomenon. This can 
be explained by the fact that high rates of dispersion can indicate difficult social contexts, where 
micro  crime  activities  can  emerge  more  easily.  Moreover,  education  dispersion  contributes  to 
produce  unskilled  or  low-profile  workers.  These  kind  of  workers  while  having  difficulties  in 
gaining access to the labour market, might have better opportunities in micro and organised crime.  
What about the positive relationship with added value (a.v.) per capita? This finding is of 
more  difficult  explanation.  Intuitively,  we  would  expect  a  negative  relationship  since  in  poor 
regions, micro crime is higher than in rich regions. But if we link a.v. per capita to population’s 
composition, the positive relationship can be explained as follows: generally, high a.v. per capita 
are associated to stronger urban population provinces compared to low a.v. provinces and, in urban 
provinces, micro crime is higher than in rural provinces. Figure 1 shows the provinces’ distribution 
related to micro crime and a.v. per capita in 2004 (see provinces’ code list in appendix). The 35 
southern  Italian  provinces  are  all  under  the  a.v.  per  capita  national  average  and,  except  for  9 
                                                 
13  Marselli  and  Vannini  (2000)  remove  this  variable  to  prevent  simultaneity  problems  with  the  crime  dependent 
variable. In place of this variable, the authors use police regional distribution. Moreover, they remove my lnineffpol too, 
called Unknown, because it incorporates a mesurement error problem that is due to the denominator composed by 
reported crimes (they use four kinds of Unknown variables: murder, robbery, theft and fraud) and so do not take in 
account the non reported crime. I have however used this variable because I build it only in respect of a composite 
variable, micro crime, that includes all the above mentioned crimes except murder, and in these crimes Robbery is the 
one more bias sensitive. Moreover, their research uses the paradigm of Total crime, while at regional level I only 
analyse a subsample of crime that can or cannot be subject to some bias problems (for example pickpocketing or car 
theft and burglary). 
14 Unemploymet rate VIF is higher than 5.   11 
provinces, are under the national micro crime average too. Crotone’s province has the lowest micro 
crime index whereas Agrigento has the lowest a.v. per capita. Among provinces gathered in the  
first quadrant (a.v. and micro crime higher than national average) Rimini has the highest micro 
crime index, followed by Bologna, Milan, Rome, Turin and Genoa. Milan is the province with the 
highest a.v. per capita. At this point we need to consider a.v. in terms of urban and rural province 
population: an high a.v. is associated to a larger urban population which can be linked to a higher 
level  of  micro  crime.  The  opposite  works  for  rural  population.  Therefore,  a  higher  a.v.  can 
encourage the micro crime phenomenon, following a process of population urbanization. Finally, 
the empirical evidence, deriving from a different estimation, shows a positive, but with decreasing 
rate,  relationship  between  micro  and  organised  crime.  Nevertheless,  this  estimation  procedure 
required a further wide elaboration because, in this case, it’s a cross section at regional level (there 
are only 20 observations). 
The  second  empirical  results  verified  concern  the  relationship  between  recurring  to  the 
informal social network and crime variables. The dummy dependent variable of the probit model 
used is 1 when the survey respondent declared to use the informal social network channel (friends, 
parents, acquaintances) to look for a job, and 0 otherwise. Main regressors are crime variables at 
regional level. The micro crime index includes No violent robbery (for example no armed robbery), 
Micro theft (snatch) and Fraud and informatic fraud (see Variable list in Appendix). The organised 
crime variable, instead, derives from a principal component analysis (PCA) based on a correlation 
matrix of the following per capita crimes: attacks, slaughter, mafia murder and attempted mafia 
murder, extortion, crime association (art. 416 penal code), mafia crime association (art. 416 bis 
penal code), money laundering, fires, contraband, drugs dealing, prostitution, falsification, mafioso 
and politician electoral exchange. 
I  consider  the  first  three  components  (tables  2  and  3):  organised  crime  is  very  well 
represented  by  factor  one  (F1)  which  takes  into  account  murder  and  attempted  mafia  murder, 
extortion, art. 416 bis p.c., fires. They have a positive sign, so a positive F1 should indicate the 
presence of organised crime in a region and its increase should imply an upsurge of the crime 
phenomenon. F2 considers two specific crimes: drugs dealing and prostitution. Their relationship 
with organised crime is obvious but they represent a particular form of this phenomenon. In fact, 
especially in the case of narcotraffico, large-scale drug selling, it is one of the most important and 
typical economic activities of organised crime. At the same time, they represent business relations 
with other foreign organizations. Therefore, if F2 represents typical associated crime economic 
activities, F1 could be considered an expression of control and repression activity and, moreover, a 
mean of organised crime justice sentence execution. In other words, it is the mafia’s armed branch. 
Finally, F3 reports a larger rate of falsification and contraband, economic activities which 
imply the legal commodity object of an illegal market. The correlation matrix between crimes and 
the principal factors (F1, F2, F3) seems to confirm the above relations. Figure 2 also seems to 
confirm this interpretation. In fact, 7 Italian regions are in F1 positive area (Calabria, Liguria, 
Campania, Puglia, Sicilia, Molise and Umbria) and, with the exception of Umbria, are the same 
regions in which the per capita crimes, related to F1 factor, are the highest in respect to the national 
average (figure 3). The same conclusions can be drawn about F2: there are 9 F2 positive Italian 
regions (Liguria,  Umbria, Campania, Piemonte, Lazio, Toscana, Marche, Emilia-Romagna and 
Friuli Venezia Giulia) and the regional distribution of these two kinds of crime (figure 4) is very 
similar to F2 positive regions. 
Using these crime indexes, I have run two probabilistic regressions. The results of the two 
probit models seem to provide empirical evidence of my hypothesis: an increase in the presence of 
the organised crime (F1) produces a more likely recourse to informal social networks (application to 
the networks in order to find a job, versus normal job employment), whereas the opposite occurs if 
there is an increase in micro crime (cridif) (table 4). This positive and negative relationship remains 
significant also in the other models with control variables. Compared to these models, the control 
variables have significant results: the positive relationship between sntw dummy and education level   12 
(edu1) and the negative one with blue collar variable imply that it is more likely that unskilled 
people  and  with  a  low  level  of  education  will  recur  to  sntw  to  find  a  job.  The  structural 
characteristic of systems usually recurring to informal social networks is being a little or medium 
size firm (size1), active in traditional economic sectors and more tightly linked to the region. This 
kind  of  profile  is  the  one  more  permeable  to  organised  crime,  which  traditionally  works  in 
economic sectors such as agriculture and construction. These sectors are still subject to “caporalato” 
(an illegal pyramid of submerged unpaid work) and to the “cosche” control that is very strong. 
What about macroeconomic variables that contribute to understand the economic condition 
of a  country? The probit model shows a persistence of micro and organised crime hypothesis. The 
bivariate regressions are all statistically significant and some of them are of the expected sign (table 
5). The joint estimates, instead, produce, for some regressors, different results, that can be explained 
theorising  a  multicollinearity  problem.  Nevertheless,  crime  variables  preserve  their  own 
significance. Furthermore, this result is strongly reinforced by the results obtained when the F1 
estimate is combined with F2 and F3 factors
15. 
The  direct  relationship  between  social  network  and  unemployment  rate  is  obvious: 
restrictions in the labour market can induce people to turn to the social network as preferred job 
search  channel.  This  relationship  can  also  be  explained  in  a  different  way:  a  decrease  in  the 
unemployment rate can derive from an increase in the number of ‘discouraged’ people. In this case, 
the unemployment rate decreases because who was looking for a job stopped doing it and, as a 
consequence, does not ask for it anymore to his friends, parents, and acquaintances. The positive 
relation between education dispersion rate (absc) and social networks (table 5) can be associated to 
the one in the micro variable estimate but in this case the variable represents an aspect of the social-
economic context. As it can be seen in figure 5, in 2004 the higher rates were found in the southern 
regions. These are the same regions where unemployment and young unemployment rates, poverty 
index  and  the  incapability  to  offer  regular  jobs  are  higher  than  the  national  average,  whereas 
employment regular rate and FDIs attraction are below national average (figures in appendix). 
In particular, in Italy FDIs are affected by the presence of criminal organizations (Daniele – 
Marani,  2008).  In  fact,  it  is  unlikely  that  foreign  investors  could  be  interested  in  investing  in 
“underworld economies” where the use of social networks instead of normal job opportunities is 
high. Only Lombardy is capable of attracting foreign investment. Southern Italy is an area which 
does not attract capital’s investments. In this case, organised crime plays a crucial role because it 
jeopardizes the potential development of the regions, affecting investment options. So, the inverse 
relationship between social network and FDI is probably due to the fact that FDIs in the south of 
Italy  depend  on  the  slow  rate  of  development  of  the  area  and,  even  more,  on  the  presence  of 
organised crime.
16 
About regular employment variables: irregular employment implies an irregular selection 
and hiring procedures. That is, there will be no advertisements in the newspapers or on the Public 
Employment  Service.  Information  on  job  opportunities  will  pass  through  word  of  mouth 
communication. If irregular employment increases there will be a higher probability to use informal 
social networks. 
Finally, some words on regional per capita added value: low added value is associated with 
a larger use of informal social networks and this happens for two possible reasons: a) low added 
value regions tend to suffer from a lack of structures and it could be difficult to offer employment 
services; b) in these regions there are high organised crime indexes. In these same regions, there are 
also micro crime indexes that are below the Italian average (except Campania). This is probably due 
                                                 
15 The negative relation of F3 depends on the criminal composition. Contraband, in particular, can be considered also a 
micro crime. In this case there can be a negative relation with the social network. 
16 In Southern Italy, lack of development is not in itself the only cause of no investment. In fact, disadvantaged areas 
could receive always foreign investment, if there were good development and growth opportunities, as there are in the 
italian south. But the presence of organised crime, associated with a system of corruption which involves local and 
national politics, continues to be a strong deterrent.   13 
to  the  presence  of  a  strong  territorial  control  of  organised  crime  in  these  regions.  Looking  at 
southern regions more involved in the phenomenon of organised crime, all of them present a.v. and 
micro crime index below national average (except Campania) and organised crime index above the 
national average (except Sicilia). 
So, in these contexts it is not the scarce incidence of micro crime which encourages a larger 
use of social networks but, instead, the presence of organised crime. 
7. Conclusions 
The aim of this analysis is to show a new interpretation of the informal social network’s 
nature. The literature on the subject assumes a generic position about the phenomenon. In fact it 
takes into account network’s structure, size and composition and explains how these characteristics 
can influence jobseekers’ job opportunities, but it has not undertaken the necessary steps to discover 
the informal social network black side. This aspect cannot be ignored if social network analysis is 
localised in deeper organised crime areas. In these cases, associated crime pollutes economic tissue 
because crime has the availability of huge amount of money deriving from illicit activities (in 
particular, large scale drugs dealing, in Italian narcotraffico) and, so, can compromise the economic 
development of an area (for example Southern Italy).  
If it is true that organised crime penetrates legal markets, its influence on the labour market 
is unavoidable. This situation is degenerated by the presence of “criminal, political and business 
networks” that, pursuing their own interest, such as social or electoral consensus, become important 
referents for job opportunities. In this study, organised crime is a variable that represents itself and 
is also a proxy of corruption. In fact “In areas where organised crime is very pervasive, It controls 
the corruption market too.” (Davigo – Mannozzi, 2007, page. 81).  
In  these  cases,  the  relationship  between  unemployment  and  criminal  and/or  institutional 
contacts derive from the coexistence of the agents on the same context: both unemployment and 
contact.  
In this study, we have highlighted the lack of this aspect in social network and criminal 
economic literature and linked labour market and organised crime through a special trait d’union 
such as informal social networks. 
Using  Calvò-Armengol  and  Zenou’s  model  (2003)  I  have  introduced  new  different 
hypothesis: the first one is about the distinction between micro and organised crime, although there 
is a grey area where both crimes overlap. In the Calvò-Armengol and Zenou model, the authors use 
a tout-court criminal basis. They do not take into account the different role that criminals can 
assume in respect to jobseekers. As results (second hypothesis) I assume that only a special kind of 
criminal can provide information about job opportunities. Micro criminals are not able to provide 
job information because they are not part of the labour force but criminals affiliated with organised 
crime play a very important different role on labour market access. So, while there exists an inverse 
relationship between social network and micro crime, there is not a similar one between social 
network  and  organised  crime.  In  the  new  model  there  are  two  conditions:  the  first  one  is  the 
negative relationship between micro crime and social network’s use, the second one is the positive 
relationship between organised crime and social network. Finally, the preliminary hypothesis is to 
demonstrate  the  inverse  relationship  between  network’s  size  and  micro  crime  and  the  positive 
decreasing rate between organised and micro crime. Empirical results seem to confirm the proposed 
hypothesis. 
So, I have formalized the organised crime interference on labour market. Results show that 
in these contexts it is not the scarce weight of micro crime that encourages the use of  social 
networks but the presence of the organised one. This ‘crowding out effect’ has been verified by the 
crime equation between micro and organised crime and other regressors. 
Another new feature of this study is the crime index composition. In fact, the organised and 
micro crime index are made using Home Office crime statistics. These allow us to use a larger   14 
number and selection of crimes compared to the Justice Department statistics which are prevalently 
used in organised crime economic literature but are less detailed. 
Finally, micro and organised crime produce different effects on the choice of informal social 
networks’ use. A larger use of networks can derive from the lack of appropriate structures and 
services for unemployed, and from the presence of organised crime (both proxy of corruption and 
expression of itself). In this situation, the role of micro crime should be replaced with organised 
crime that can provide non-neutral information useful to reach an employment status. In “free” 
organised crime contexts, micro crime reconquers its role of ‘brake’ to social network because it 
increases the probability to meet persons not able to provide job information. 
 
The agenda for future research in these topics should include a broading organised crime 
index taking into account white collar crime and corruption phenomena. Moreover the estimated 
crime equation give us the possibility to understand the relationship between organised and micro-
crime but we are not sure about the direction of causality between these two variables and it could 
be useful to verify the potential endogeneity problem. Finally it could have been interesting to use a 
panel methodology to take into account also of cycle effects and confirm evidence and information, 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   16 
Figure 1 
 






(principal components; 5 components retained) 
Component    Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
1        5.41049         2.37911      0.3382         0.3382 
2        3.03137         1.33015      0.1895         0.5276 
3        1.70122         0.12489      0.1063         0.6339 
4        1.57633         0.36240      0.0985         0.7325 
5        1.21393         0.42209      0.0759         0.8083 
6        0.79184         0.09416      0.0495         0.8578 
7        0.69767         0.07723      0.0436         0.9014 
8        0.62045         0.27600      0.0388         0.9402 
9        0.34444         0.13229      0.0215         0.9617 
10       0.21215         0.07375      0.0133         0.9750 
11       0.13840         0.04262      0.0087         0.9836 
12       0.09578         0.01095      0.0060         0.9896 
13       0.08483         0.02930      0.0053         0.9949
14       0.05553         0.03296      0.0035         0.9984 
15       0.02257         0.01958      0.0014         0.9998 
16       0.00299               .      0.0002         1.0000 
 
   17 
Table 3 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                          Eigenvectors
            Variable |      1          2          3          4          5 
        -------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
        attentatixab |   0.28707    0.12379   -0.38906    0.01120   -0.32269 
           stragexab |   0.24438    0.16179   -0.33948    0.06383    0.01329 
            ommafxab |   0.31940   -0.02753    0.20724   -0.21989   -0.38825 
          tentomfxab |   0.38822   -0.09593   -0.07511   -0.15652   -0.10073 
            ricetxab |   0.20138    0.43981    0.23425   -0.07730    0.04221 
            estorxab |   0.39431   -0.06933   -0.01275    0.04486    0.09315 
            usuraxab |   0.12763   -0.28533    0.08085    0.45146   -0.03660 
             _416xab |   0.20574   -0.15493    0.00411    0.53965    0.19541
          _416bisxab |   0.35536   -0.18161   -0.07660   -0.21954    0.23828 
          ricicloxab |   0.23330    0.29739    0.24904    0.10635    0.23211 
          incendixab |   0.34027   -0.08478   -0.12491    0.18766   -0.07859 
            cntrbxab |   0.18544    0.35458    0.40910   -0.15045   -0.03605 
            drogaxab |  -0.03660    0.41260   -0.20453    0.27453    0.12215 
           cntrffxab |   0.05462   -0.08221    0.50129    0.28592    0.11402 
            prostxab |  -0.07209    0.44652   -0.25059    0.19144    0.11381 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   24 
Variables list 
This list is based on territorial disaggregation of data (regional and provincial) and on observation 
size that is micro or macro unit. 
Regional data: 
1.  Micro crime index (crdif): sum of particular kinds of Theft, Robbery and Total Fraud on 
regional population. Theft crimes considered are: purse snatching, theft sleight of hand, theft 
in  public  office,  burglary,  shoplifiting,  theft  on  parked  car,  of  objets  d’art  and 
archaeological material, of trucks trasporting goods (up to 2003 it was called theft of goods 
on trucks), of moped and car. Robbery crimes are: at home, in a shop or in a public street 
(Source: Public Security Department – DPS – Home Office) 
2.  Organised crime index (F1): derives from a principal component analysis (PCA) based on 
a correlation matrix of the following per capita crimes: attacks, slaughter, mafia murder 
and attempted mafia murder, extortion, crime association (art. 416 penal code), mafia crime 
association (art. 416 bis penal code), money laundering, fires, contraband, drugs dealing, 
prostitution, falsification, mafioso and politician electoral exchange. 
3.  Police territory control (lnffoo): number of policemen in a region (Carabinieri, Polizia di 
Stato e Guardia di Finanza)  on regional population (%). Data referred to 2003 (Source:  
Compendio Statistico degli Eventi Criminosi 2003 del Ministero dell’Interno). 
4.  Police investigations skills respect micro crime phenomenon: unknown reported crimes 
on reported crimes (crimes refer to micro crime) (Source: Public Security Department – 
Home Office) 
5.  Unemployment rate 15 – 64 years (disoc): people looking for a job on labour force (%) 
(Source Istat)  
6.  Young unemployment rate (disocgiov): people looking for a job 15-24 years on labour 
force of the same age (%) (Source Istat) 
7.  Regular  jobs  supply  ability  (offlavreg):  irregular  work  unit  on  total  work  unit  (%). 
Irregular  work  unit  takes  in  account:  irregular  permanent  workers;  occasional  ‘works’ 
carried  out  by  inactive  subjects  such  as  students,  housewifes  or  pensioners;  illegal 
immigrants; others irregular activities (Source Istat).  
8.  Regular employment rate (occreg): regular employment on population 15-64 years (%) 
(Source Istat) 
9.  School dispersion (absc): young people (18-24 years), attending at most a secondary school 
(first degree) and that did not attend others school courses or training activities over 2 years 
(%) (Source Istat) 
10. Regional poor index (poor_idx): people living in families below poverty line (%). It 
includes families whose monthly average consumption expenditure is even or under national 
average per capita spending. (Source Istat) 
11. Foreign investments draw ability (atzfdi): Foreign gross direct investiments in Italy on 
net direct investiments in EU15 (0/00) (Source Istat) 
12. Added value (lnvaab): euro added value per capita measured by base prices (Source Istat). 
The logarithmic form has been used. 
 
Provincial data 
(They are all logarithmic variables)   25 
1.  Micro crime index (lncrdif1): sum of total thefts, frauds and micro robberies (that is, we 
have used  the variable other robberies that incorporate theft in a shop, in a house etc.) 
reported to justice. This sum is based on the provincial population (1.000 people). (Source 
Istat) 
2.  Organised crime index (lncrorg): the index composition is similar to the one on micro 
crime.  Crimes  considered  are:  crime  association  (art.  416  penal  code),  mafia  crime 
association  (art.  416  bis  penal  code),  mafia  murder,  attacks,  slaughter,  extorsion,  fires 
(arson), contraband, usury, drogs, prostitution. (Source Istat) 
3.  Police  investigation  skills  (lnineffpol):  unknown  reported  crimes  on  reported  crimes 
(crimes refer to micro crime). (Source Istat) 
4.  Certezza  della  pena  (lnprob):  prisoners  on  reported  crimes  upon  which  the  Judicial 
Authority undertook penal action (Source Istat) 
5.  Added value (lnvaab): euro added value per capita mesured by base prices – year 2004. 
(Source Istat). 
6.  School dispersion (lnabsc): students who abandoned Secondary school (II degree) (%). 
Academic year 2006/2007.  
7.  Unemployment  rate  (lndisoc):  is  the  percentage  of  unemployment  rate  (average  2004) 
(Source Istat) 
8.  Rural population (lnpoprur04): rural population in 2004 at provincial level (Source Istat)  
9.  Urban population (lnpopalturb04): urban population in 2004 at provincial level(Source 
Istat) 
 
Microeconomic data (SHIW – Banca d’Italia) 
1.  Edu1: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent’s highest education level is compulsory 
school or nothing and 0 otherwise  
2.  Size1: dummy variable equal to 1 if firm size is under 20 employees and 0 otherwise 
3.  bcollar: dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent is a blue collar and 0 otherwise  
4.  agricolture: dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent works in the agricultural sector and 0 
otherwise  
5.  costruzioni: dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent works in the construction sector and 0 
otherwise 
6.  SUD: dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent’s residence is in the southern of Italy and 0 
otherwise 









Provinces code list  
  
1  Torino  36 Genova  71  Chieti 
2  Vercelli  37 La Spezia  72  Isernia 
3  Novara  38 Piacenza  73  Campobasso 
4  Verbano-Cusio-Ossola  39 Parma  74  Caserta 
5  Cuneo  40 Reggio nell'Emilia  75  Benevento 
6  Biella  41 Modena  76  Napoli 
7  Asti  42 Bologna  77  Avellino 
8  Alessandria  43 Ferrara  78  Salerno 
9  Aosta  44 Ravenna  79  Foggia 
10 Varese  45 Forlì-Cesena  80  Bari 
11 Como  46 Rimini  81  Taranto 
12 Lecco  47 Massa-Carrara  82  Brindisi 
13 Sondrio  48 Lucca  83  Lecce 
14 Milano  49 Pistoia  84  Potenza 
15 Lodi  50 Firenze  85  Matera 
16 Bergamo  51 Prato  86  Cosenza 
17 Brescia  52 Livorno  87  Crotone 
18 Pavia  53 Pisa  88  Catanzaro 
19 Cremona  54 Arezzo  89  Vibo Valentia 
20 Mantova  55 Siena  90  Reggio di Calabria 
21 Bolzano  56 Grosseto  91  Trapani 
22 Trento  57 Perugia  92  Palermo 
23 Verona  58 Terni  93  Messina 
24 Vicenza  59 Pesaro e Urbino  94  Agrigento 
25 Belluno  60 Ancona  95  Caltanissetta 
26 Treviso  61 Macerata  96  Enna 
27 Venezia  62 Ascoli Piceno  97  Catania 
28 Padova  63 Viterbo  98  Ragusa 
29 Rovigo  64 Rieti  99  Siracusa 
30 Pordenone  65 Roma  100 Sassari 
31 Udine  66 Latina  101 Nuoro 
32 Gorizia  67 Frosinone  102 Oristano 
33 Trieste  68 L'Aquila  103 Cagliari 
34 Imperia  69 Teramo       
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